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Recent Cases
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-POWER OF FEDERAL COURT TO RESTRAIN STATE PROCEEDINGS
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.
Toucey, alleging fraud by the defendant company, brought suit in a Missouri
state court to set aside a reduction in the amount of a life insurance policy, to
reinstate the policy as originally written, and to recover disability benefits there-
under. The suit was removed to the federal District Court for the Western District
of Missouri. This court dismissed the bill, finding that there was no fraud on
defendant's part and that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
policy; no appeal was taken, and the decree became final. A short time later
Toucey's assignee sought to relitigate the same issues in a Missouri state court.
Upon defendant's filing of a "supplemental bill," the federal court which had en-
tered the original decree enjoined the "retrial, reconsideration, or readjudication"
of the settled issues and the prosecution of the state action. After the granting
of this injunction was affirmed 2 by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3 and subsequently a
rehearing. The Supreme Court's decision to reverse the decrees also applied to
another case which was then there for consideration, because "the controlling
question in both is the same."
In this companion case-a mortgage foreclosure suit brought in a federal
court by bondholdeis, the court adopted, as modified, the master's conclusions,
and the decree invalidated the mortgage and bonds issued in consideration of the
claimed indebtedness, this decree becoming final.4 Parties to these proceedings
thereafter instituted five separate suits in the Delaware state courts, seeking
1. 62 S. Ct. 139 (1941). "The distribution of judicial authority between
state and Federal courts is one phase, and perhaps the most delicate, of the ever-
recurring problem of the distribution of power between the states and the nation.
Wisdom in the distribution of this judicial power is thus important for the happy
relations of the states to the nation," Frankfurter, The Federal Courts (1929) 58.
NEw REPUBLIC 273; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAv
L. REv. 344, 346.
2. 102 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), cert. denied, 307 U. S. 638 (1939).
The injunction was made permanent, Toucey appealed, and the circuit court of
appeals again affirmed, 112 Fed. (2d) 927 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
3. 311 U. S. 643 (1940). The decision below was affirmed by an equally-
divided Court, 313 U. S. 538 (1941), rehearing granted, 313 U. S. 596 (1941).
4. 98 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 650 (1938).
5. In one of these suits the state court held that no valid defense had been
shown under the plea of res adjudicata, 1 Terry 500, 14 A. (2d) 386, 390 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1940); this state court said there had been a misjoinder of parties in
the federal court, that therefore the only parties before the federal court were
connected with the collateral and not the antecedent debt, and that therefore "the:
(310)
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recovery on various notes and contracts claimed to have constituted the considera-
tion for the bonds. Defendant filed a "supplemental bill" in the federal court which
had issued the original decree; the court, on a finding that the causes declared
upon in Delaware had been settled by the federal litigation, enjoined plaintiff from
further prosecuting the state suits. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed,6 and then certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter propounded
the following as being the controlling question in both cases: "Does a federal
court have power to stay a proceeding in a state court simply because the claim
has previously been adjudicated in the federal court?" 7 Any answer to this question
involves primarily the interpretations of portions of three federal statutes, of
which the last two named appear literally to be in partial conflict s One is to the
effect that the pleading of a federal decree as res adjudicata9 in a state suit raises
a federal question reviewable in the Supreme Court. The second is tat the courts
of the United States ". . . shall have power to issue all writs ...which may be
necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law."10 The third one, now judicially referred to as Section
265, of the Judicial Code (REv. STAT. § 720), provides that, "The writ of injunc-
tion shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in
any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by
any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."'-
invalidity of the collateral does not necessarily destroy the validity of the under-
lying debt." Note the statement of Mr. Justice Reed in his dissent in the prin-
cipal case: "It (the federal decree) is to be only the basis for a plea of res j}udicata
which is to be examined by another court, unfamiliar with the record already
made, to determine whether the issues were or were not settled by the former
adjudication."
6. Phoenix Finance Corp. v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co., 115 F. (2d) 1(C. C. A. 8th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 670 (1941). Concerning the view
held by the Delaware state court, preceding note, the circuit court of appeals said,
p. 10: "There can bd no merit in such a contention. The entire transaction was
decreed to be fraudulent and without consideration. A successful defense on the
merits in an action either on the principal debt or the collateral will bar an action
on the other."
7. Compare the phraseology of Mr. Justice Reed, with whom the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts concurred, dissenting, "The controlling issue is the
power of a federal court to protect those who have obtained its decrees against an
effort to force relitigation of the same causes of action in the state courts."
8. Terre Haute & I. R. R. v. Peoria & P. Union R. R., 82 Fed. 943, 946(N. D. Ill. 1897), the court saying, "In their literal scope, the Constitution and
statutes conferring jurisdiction, and this § 720, are in conflict, and to the extent
of such conflict the legal effect of the latter statute must be narrowed down."
9. 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (b) (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305
U. S. 165 (1938).
10. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 377 (1940).
11. 36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1940); Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 183 (1919) (". . . it is intended to give effect to a familiar
rule of comity and like that rule is limited in its field of operation.") Professor
Schofield in deploring the fact that the injunction had supplanted the stay-order
procedure, (1911) 5 ILL. L. REv. 508, 510, said, ". . . (§ 265) and the stay order
19421
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The language of the Act of 1793 originally constituted an unqualified prohibi-
tion, and the only legislative exception which has been directly incorporated into
Section 265 is the provision concerning the bankruptcy proceedings.' 2 The other
legislative exceptions are those pertaining to the removal of actions,13 the limita-
tion of shipowners' liability,14 the Interpleader Act of 1926,11 and the Frazier-
Lemke Act;' 6 and a recognized exception by judicial construction is that of the
res cases.'17 The question presented by the principal cases is whether there has
procedure went upon the constitutional theory that when a state judge officially
knows that a prior suit is pending in a federal court and is asked to stop a second
suit for the same thing in his own court, the Constitution requires the state judge
to stop the second suit; the Constitution is a standing perpetual injunction to the
state judge as well as to the party; no injunction from the- federal court is needed
. .." Durfee and Sloss concluded, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts; The Life History of a Statute (1932) 30 MicH. L. RE V. 1145, 1146, " . ..
that Congress, without thinking the matter through to the end, meant precisely
that no injunction should be granted to stay any proceedings in state courts." But
nevertheless, ". . . it seems a safe assertion that the cases in which injunctions
against state proceedings were sought to be prevented are the very ones in which
the statute has been refused operation," Taylor and Willis, Power of Federal Courts
to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169, 1194.
12. It has been held that "even when judicial powers are conferred upon
state commissions, they are not courts within the meaning of the act so as to pre-
vent the issue of injunctions against them by the federal courts," Warren , supra
note 1, at 372. "But the preference for state review . . . cannot be regarded as
an acute public problem. The Judicial Code makes it feasible for every state to
require these cases to be first passed upon by the state courts," Lilienthal, The
Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV.379, 421. Here also must be considered the effect of The Johnson Act, 48 STAT.
775 (1934), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (1940).
13. 36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 72 (1940); Dietzsch v. Huidekoper,
103 U. S. 494 (1880). The justification stated for making this exception is that
the federal court is "merely acting to protect its own jurisdiction." But the prin-
ciples underlying Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922), make this rea-
son in itself insufficient; however, as this exception still exists, it would seem that
the "relitigation" exception were proper; Taylor and Willis, supra note 11, at 1174
and 1176. See also Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 508; Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1924) 37 HAxv. L. REv. 49, 131(advocating the repeal of the removal laws); notes (1939) 122 A. L. R. 1425, 1431;
(1923) 24 A. L. R. 1084, 1104.
14. REv. STAT. § 4285 (1878), 46 U. S. C. § 185 (1940); Providence & N. Y.
S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 578 (1883).
15. 49 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (26) (1940); Dugas v. American
Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414 (1937) (note, however, that the authorities cited in this
case are some of those which the dissent in the principal case regards as "relitiga-
tion" cases).
16. 47 STAT. 1470 (1933), 11 U. S. C. § 203 (1940); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308
U. S. 433 (1938).
17. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922) (saying,
the rule was firmly established that the pendency (italics mine) in a federal court
of an action in personam was neither ground for abating a subsequent action in
a state court nor for the issuance of an injunction against its prosecution.") For
distinguishing features of this statement, see note 23, infra. However, compare
the language of Judge Donahue, Limit of State and Federal Jurisdiction (1923)
9 A. B. A. J. 479, 483: "The tribunal whose jurisdiction first attaches holds it to
[Vol. 7
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arisen by judicial construction another exception, that of the so-called "relitiga-
tion" cases.-" Mr. Justice Frankfurter disposed of this type of case either by
classifying the decisions under one of the above exceptions, or by saying that
" . . the fact that one exception (by judicial construction, the res cases) has
found its way into Section 265 is no justificatior for making another." On the
other hand, Mr. Justice Reed in his dissenting opinion contended not only that
this exception does exist, but alsa that it was embodied in and continued by the
Judicial Code of 1911.19 Disregarding the matter of implied Congressional adoption
of this exception, it seems certain that the language20 in many cases is broad enough
to warrant the conclusion that this exception does exist by judicial construction,
although there is also language to the contrary and to the effect that federal
"interference" is prohibited if the action in the federal court is in personam.21
Two problems are thus presented; first, as to the cases themselves, and second,
as to the policy underlying any exception arising by judicial construction. The
cases must be distinguished not only on their facts but also on their pleadings and
stage of proceedings; it must be ascertained whether the action is in rem or in
the exclusion of the other until the jurisdiction involved is exhausted. This rule,
however, is limited to actions which deal either with the rem or potentially with
specific property and does not apply to actions strictly in personam."
18. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 (1934); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (1921); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 200 U. S.
273 (1906); Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Alabama & G. Mfg. Co., 198 U. S. 188 (1904);
Julian v. Central Trust Company, 193 U. S. 93 (1903). The writ of injunction is
addressed to the party litigant and not to the court; Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S.
589, 600 (1891).
19. Mr. Justice Reed said, "Certainly when the Code of 1911 restated its
terms, the Congress took into consideration what had by that time come to be its
accepted interpretation.... (Although) no change in language was suggested, yet
the Committee (on revision) as indicative of the then state of the law cited
numerous cases which are relitigation cases. . . ." Opposing this, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter was equally convinced that "there is no warrant for the assumption that,
in the proposals for the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress had before it the "relitiga-
tion" exception as settled doctrine, and that by § 265 gave it legislative confirma-
tion." Durfee and Sloss, supra note 11, at 1169, suggest that even if there were
such Congressional adoption, still ". . . there is the alternative road of comity. The
statute does not demand injunction in any case."
20. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234, 239 (1934) ("That a federal
court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary to an original case or proceeding
in the same court, whether at law or in equity, to secure or preserve the fruits
and advantages of a judgment or decree rendered therein, is well settled. . . .The
proceeding being ancillary and dependent, the jurisdiction of the court follows
that of the original cause, and may be maintained without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties or the amount involved, and notwithstanding the provisions of
section 265 of the Judicial Code.") See note 18, supra. And in an inferior federal
court, in a suit to cancel a life and disability insurance policy for fraud--suit in
personam, the court said, "In cases such as the one at bar, a recovery in the action
in the state court will delay and obstruct the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
federal court in equity and may lead to a conflict of authority, even though each
court acts in accordance with the law," Brown v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 F.(2d) 711, 713 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 1531.
21. See note 17, supra.
19421
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personam,22 and, if the action be in personam, whether the action has been adjudi-
cated finally in either court or is pending.23 As to these factors, even the Court
could not agree as to the proper classification of the cases. However, in conjunc-
tion with the dissent in the principal cases, it is submitted that federal injunctions
have been decreed in cases which can be properly regarded as involving in personamr
proceedings. 24
Considering then the policies involved, it has been said that Section 265
". expresses the desire of Congress to avoid friction between the federal govern-
ment and the states resulting from the intrusion of federal authority into the
orderly functioning of a state's judicial process." 25 The recognized exception shown
by the reciprocal doctrine of the res cases is said to be but an application of the
reason underlying Section 265, in that that exception prevents actual physical
conflict concerning the same physical property. Certainly the basis for that excep-
tion cannot be used as a reason for allowing "interference" in the in personam
cases. Yet, when the policy underlying the removal 26 exception is noted, to allow
22. But even if the federal court has prior jurisdiction of specific property,
if the state suit would not have the effect of "impairing or frustrating the jurisdic-
tion of the federal court," then the state action may not be enjoined; Chicago Title
& T. Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp., 69 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). The federal
court "may enjoin as well before the state court proceeding goes to judgment as
afterward," Sand Springs Home v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 16 F. (2d) 917,
918 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); compare Durfee and Sloss, supra note 11, at 1158 and
1160. Durfee and Sloss also suggest, at 1156 and 1164, that the cases cannot be
effectually distinguished on the basis of whether the federal injunction is ancillary
or is original.
23. As stated in Bethke v. Grayburg Oil Co., 89 F. (2d) 536, 538 (C. C. A.
5th, 1937), "In the Kline case (supra note 17) . . . it appeared both suits were
only in personam and were pending and undecided when the injunction issued out
of the federal court . . . Here, the case in the federal court had terminated in
final judgment. . . . The jurisdiction of federal courts to enjoin parties to suits in
state courts has been successfully invoked in a number of cases where the juris-
diction of both courts was only in personam." Also, ". . . the authorities relied
on in the Kline case were chiefly decisions which did not rest on the statute," Durfee
and Sloss, supra note 11, at 1169 (footnote 74).
The Supreme Court said in Penn General Casualty Co. v. Commonwealth, 294
U. S. 189, 195 (1935), "Where the judgment sought is strictly in personam . . .
both a state court and a federal court having concurrent jurisdiction may proceed
with the litigation, at least until judgment is obtained in one court which may be
set up as res adjudicata in the other." (italics mine) It should be noted that in
the Hunt and Kline cases, ". . . both opinions were by Mr. Justice Sutherland;
and, in the Hunt case, no reference was made to the holding in Kline v. Burke
Const. Co., and the latter case therefore was not, and should not be regarded as
effecting the rule announced in the Hunt case," Hesselberg v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
102 F. (2d) 23, 27 (C .C. A. 8th, 1939). In Southern Ry. v. Painter, 62 S. Ct.
154, 156 (1941), the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Reed con-
curred, saying, "The reasons which led to dissent in Toucey v. New York Life
Ins. Co. do not exist in this case. There is no federal decree and therefore no need
of an injunction to protect the decree or prevent litigation."
24. Looney v. Eastern Texas Ry., 247 U. S. 214 (1918); Gunter v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 200 U. S. 273 (1906); French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250 (U. S. 1875);
Durfee and Sloss, supra note 11, at 1165. See notes 18 and 23, supra.
25. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 62 S. Ct. 139, 145 (1941).
26. See note 13, supra.
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the federal court "to protect its own jurisdiction,'" it would seem that this reason
would be applicable to the in personam cases. Furthermore, it is submitted that
the effect of the res adjudicata statute should be considered. Concededly it can
be argued that as such statute exists then there is no need for federal "interference"
in the in personam actions; however, it would seem that the better argument should
be thae the federal court has the power to protect its litigants from the doubt,
time, and expense necessarily involved by proceeding under this statute.27
The opinions of both the majority and the dissent show rather extensive
analyses of the cases, a consideration of legislative history, and a review of articles
pertinent to the problems; but in view of the apparently conflicting past decisions,
the result reached in the principal cases seems supported mainly by judicial classi-
fication and is seemingly based primarily on almost arbitrary and belated literal
adherence to the provisions of Section 265.28 The holding seems explainable, al-'
though perhaps justifiably, only by reference to one of Mr. Justice Frankfurters
citations29 and to his statements: "Whatever justification there may be for turning
past error into law when reasonable expectations would thereby (otherwise?) be
defeated, no such justification can be urged on behalf of a procedural doctrine in
the distribution of judicial power between federal and state courts. It denies
reality to suggest that litigants have shaped their conduct upon some loose talk
27. Consider the reasoning of Judge Woodrough, 102 F. (2d) 16, 22 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939), who said, "If any necessity had been anticipated the federal court
would doubtless have gone through the formality coincident with the decree of
ordering Mr. Toucey to bring the policy into court for physical destruction by the
marshall and would have admonished Mr. Toucey by appropriate writ of order to
assert no claims under it. Such formality was pretermitted, as mere formalities
tend to be in these days. . . .It is apparent therefore, that unless the court upon
adjudging and decreeing that Mr. Toucey had no rights to re-instatement or re-
covery upon his policy, proceeds further and accords the insurance company some
order against Mr. Toucey to effectuate the decree of the court, then the decree
would amount to no more than a mere judicial declaration. See note 5, supra.
28. Compare Taylor and Willis, supra note 11, at 1196 and 1197, saying,
"The very nature of the problem is such that to lay down a rigid rule governing
the right of a federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in deference to a state
court is neither practicable nor desirable .... Adjustment is still necessary to insure
harmony. . . .These considerations, and the revived attitude of respect for the
statute . . . strongly suggest the possibility and desirability of the revitalization
of Section 265. Other decisions lend weight to a belief that in the future delicate
problems of conflicting jurisdiction will be solved in the federal courts more often
by a stay of their own proceedings than by the manufacture of ingenious devices
for evading the statute."
29. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said, "Compare Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S.
106, 119, 120 . . ." (1940). This case does not involve the problem of the prin-
cipal case, but at the pages cited it was stated: "But stare decisis is a principle
of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, how-
ever recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior
doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experi-
ence .... It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional
silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines. To explain non-
action by Congress when Congress itself lends no light is to venture into specu-
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in past decisions... (or) upon erroneous implications.... We must be scrupulous
irl our regard for the limits within which Congress has confined the authority of
the courts of its own creation."
PAUL D. HEss, JR.
FEDERAL JURISDIcTIoN-DIERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP-ALIGNMENT OF PARTIES
Chase National Bank of City of New York v. City of Indianapolis, Citizens Gas Co.
of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Gas Co.'
Chase, a New York corporation, was trustee under a mortgage deed to secure
a bond issue executed by Indianapolis Gas, an Indiana corporation. The latter had
leased its property for ninety-nine years to Citizens Gas, also an Indiana corpora-
tion, which agreed to pay as rental (a) the interest on the lessor's outstanding
indebtedness, and (b) annual sums equal to six per cent return on the common
stock of Indianapolis Gas. Citizens Gas was required by its franchise after twenty-
five years to convey its property to the City subject to the Company's "outstanding
legal obligations." Upon conveyance of the property, including the lease, the City
refused to be bound by the lease.
Chase sued the three Indiana defendants, praying that the lease be declared
binding on all defendants, that the City pay the interest directly to Chase, and that
plaintiff be awarded costs and attorney's fees. The City and Citizens denied,
while Indianapolis Gas admitted, that the lease was binding.
The district court found no collision of interests between Chase and Indian-
apolis Gas and realigned the latter as party plaintiff. Finding identity of citizenship
between some plaintiffs and the defendants, the suit was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. The circuit court of appeals reversed this ruling, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. On remand to the district court the lease was held not binding
on the City or Citizens Gas, and judgment was rendered against Indianapolis Gas
for the amount of the unpaid interest. Chase and Indianapolis Gas appealed claim-
ing the lease was valid, and the circuit court of appeals sustained their contention
and found the defendants liable in the following order: City, Citizens Gas, and
Indianapolis Gas.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority of the court, said that the
only question involved was whether the lease was binding on the City and that the
rest was "window-dressing" to satisfy diversity jurisdiction.2 Chase and Indianapolis
Gas were united on this issue, both contending for the validity of the lease and the
City's obligation under it. What Chase wanted, Indianapolis Gas wanted, and the
City did not want. Therefore, Indiana "citizens were on both sides of the litiga-
tion, and there was no jurisdiction. Whether the necessary "collision of interests" a
1. 62 Sup. Ct. 15 (1941).
2. Jud. Code § 24(1), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(1), conferring upon the district
courts jurisdiction "of all matters of a civil nature .. where the matter in contro-
versy exceeds ... $3000, and ... is between citizens of different states ...
3. Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Trust Co., 197 U. S. 178, 181 (1904).
[Vol. 7
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exists must be determined from the "principal purpose of the suit"4 and the "pri-
mary and controlling matter in dispute."s q
Here was a case which had been before the federal courts several years, and
which had twice run the gauntlet through the district court to the circuit court of
appeals and finally to the Supreme Court. Three large corporations and a populous
municipality anxiously awaited the determination of this controversy. Three years
earlier the Supreme Court had refused to review the decision of the circuit court of
appeals to the effect that federal jurisdiction existed. Now the same court has de-
cided to further delay the outcome of this dispute.
This case presents the problem of the authority of a federal court properly to
align the parties according to the nature of their actual interests in the dispute,
and thereby determine whether the requisite total diversity of citizenship6 exists to
give jurisdiction. If the facts of the case show that the plaintiff's alignment of the
parties does not conform to the real interests of the parties, and if the proper align-
ment shows that complete diversity does not exist, federal jurisdiction will be de-
feated.7
The power of the courts to ascertain the real matter in dispute and arrange
the parties on one side or the other of that dispute has long been conceded.8
4. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. R. v. .rayson, 119 U. S. 240, 244 (1886).
5. Merchants' Cotton-Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co., 151 U. S. 368,
385 (1893).
6. All the citizens on one side of the controversy must be citizens of different
states from all parties on the other side. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267
(U. S. 1806).
7. MooRa AND FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTICE (1938) 2136.
S. Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457 (1879); Pacific R. R. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S.
289 (1879); Harter v. Kernochan, 103 U. S. 562 (1880), was a suit to contest the
validity of municipal bonds, brought by a resident taxpayer against resident munic-
ipal officials and a non-resident bondholder. Removal was allowed on the ground
that the interests of the taxpayer and the officials were identical. The sole matter
in dispute was the liability of the township upon the bonds-on one side were the
taxpayer and the township officers, on the other was the owner of the bonds.
Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S. 279 (1886); Evers v. Watson, 156 U. S. 527 (1895);
Consolidated Water Co. v. Babcock, 76 Fed. 243 (S. D. Cal. 1896); Johnson v.
Ford, 109 Fed. 501 (D. Ore. 1901).
In Blacklock v. Small, 127 U. S. 96 (1888), one of the defendants joined in
the prayer of the bill and therefore was aligned with the plaintiffs. Accord: Lin-
dauer v. Compania Palomas de Terrenos y Ganados, Sociedad Anomimo, 247 Fed.
428 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), if the corporation is made a defendant in a suit which
is one in the right of the corporation, but joins in the prayer of the bill, it will be
aligned as plaintiff.
In Steele v. Culver, 211 U. S. 26 (1908), no relief was asked against the de-
fendant, so it was aligned with the plaintiff. Accord: Brown v. Denver Omnibus &
Cab Co., 254 Fed. 560 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918), holding that the omission of any prayer
for judgment against the defendant trustee, who had refused to act, warranted the
federal court in treating the trustee as plaintiff.
In Merchants' Cotton-Press & Storage Co. v. Insurance Co., see note 5, supra,
the primary controversy was between the complainants and the carrier, but the
compress company was an indispensable party. Upon arranging the parties accord-
1942]
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The majority opinion in the Chase case relied heavily upon Dawson v. Colun-
bia Ave. Say. Fund, Safe Deposit, Title & Trust Co.0 That was a suit by a Penn-
sylvania mortgagee of a Georgia waterworks company against a Georgia munici-
pality and the company to restrain the city from building a new waterworks and
enforce the municipality's contract with the company. The court decided that the
interests of the mortgagee and the company were not antagonistic, and that the
company was made a defendant instead of a plaintiff for the purpose of reopening
in the federal courts a controversy which had been decided against the company
in the state court.10 The court said that "it would look beyond the pleadings and
arrange the parties according to their sides in the dispute."'1 The arrangement of
the parties was held to be a mere contrivance between friends for the purpose of
founding a jurisdiction which would not otherwise exist.
But before making such realignment of the parties, the courts make certain
that the real interest is determined, rather than some apparent interest.' 2 In
Hirsch v. Stone,13 where the defendant trustee was antagonistic to the plaintiff
noteholders, the court ruled that he should not be realigned with the cestiis. The
trustee who refused to bring suit was not realigned ,with the plaintiff bondholders
in Omaha Hotel Co. v. Wade.14
Although it would have been to the financial interest of the corporation for the
suit to succeed, the defendant corporation and the complaining stockholder were
not -placed on the same side of the controversy in Venner v. Great Northern Ry.,'5
because the corporation united with the other defendant in resisting the claim of
fraud, and both were alleged to have engaged in the same illegal conduct by joint
action. And in Doctor v. Harrngton6 the fact that the ultimate interest of a
corporate defendant may be the same as that of the complaining stockholders did
ing to their real relation to the primary controversy, there was no ground for diver-
sity of citizenship.
In Hamer v. New York Rys., 244 U. S. 266 (1917), the trustee was realigned
as plaintiff because his interests were wholly with the plaintiff.
Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union, 254 U. S. 77 (1920), was a
suit by a corporation against its subsidiary and a local union to break a strike.
There was no substantial "collision of interest" between the plaintiff and the sub-
sidiary, so the latter was aligned with the plaintiff.
Lee v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 267 U. S. 542 (1924), was a suit by the owner
of one-half interest in a mine against the lessee and other one-half owner to cancel
the lease. The defendant owner belonged on the same side of the controversy as
the plaintiff owner.
Joseph Dry Goods Co. v. Hecht, 120 Fed. 760 (C. C. A. 5th, 1903); Kelly v.
Dolan, 218 Fed. 966 (E. D. Pa. 1914).
9. See note 3, supra.
10. City of Dawson v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696 (1889).
11. See note 3, supra at 180.
12. See note 7, supra 2t 2137.
13. 62 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 747 (1933).
14. 97 U. S. 13 (1878). But cf. Allen-West Commission Co. v. Brashear, 176
Fed. 119 (E. D. Ark. 1910), where trustee who refused to act was treated as plain-
tiff, and Menefee v. Frost, 123 Fed. 633 (S. D. N. Y. 1903).
15. 209 U. S. 24 (1908).
16. 196 U. S. 579 (1904). Accord: Kelly v. Mississippi River Coaling Co.,
175 Fed. 482 (W. D. Pa. 1909); cf. Helm v. Zarecor, 222 U. S. 32 (1911), where
9
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not require that the corporation be grouped on the side of the plaintiffs, where the
bill alleged that the corporation was under a control antagonistic to the plaintiffs.
Where the only issue concerned the amount of the debt, and the defendant
mortgagor agreed with the plaintiff, but the issue was contested by another mort-
gagor who had assumed the entire mortgage debt, the mortgage and the debt was
the subject matter of the controversy. In this situation the court in Ayres v. Wis-
wall' 7 held that if the plaintiff's claim is sustained, the decree must run against all
the defendants who owe the debt jointly.
It was held to be error in Sutton v. Ezglish18 to align one of the defendants
with the plaintiffs where her interest was adverse to the plaintiffs on one out of
four issues, although with the plaintiffs as to three out of four.
Thei dissenting justices in the Chase case objected to the court's conclusion
that a real controversy did not exist between Chase and Indianapolis Gas so that
they could properly be on opposite sides of the litigation. The dissent contended
that "the measure of jurisdiction should be taken from the pleadings unless the
claims are frivolous" which was not the case here. Therm did not appear to be
the slightest indication of such a connivance to confer jurisdiction as existed in
the Dawson case.
Chase alleged a cause of action aginst the City on its undertaking to pay the
indebtedness on the mortgage given by Indianapolis Gas. It also alleged a cause
of action against Indianapolis Gas for the amount of the coupon interest. If the
plaintiff had brought two separate actions, both would have been within federal
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction should not be lost when these two causes of actions were
united, merely because one defendant as surety sought to be exonerated by the
other who was alleged to be the principal debtor. Although the City may be pri-
marily liable for this indebtedness, the judgment must run against all the debtors.
As long as there is a legal dispute between Chase and Indianapolis Gas, a real con-
troversy would seem to exist.
If it is decided that the City is not liable for the mortgage debt, then Chase
will need this judgment against the mortgagor in order to pursue the mortgaged
the controversy was over the control of a corporation. The court said that the
corporation was properly made a defendant and should not be aligned as party
plaintiff merely because its board and officers agreed with all the contentions of the
plaintiffs.
17. 112 U. S. 187 (1884).
18. 246 U. S. 199 (1917). Plaintiffs, who included all the heirs of Mary Jane
Hubbard except Cora, who was residuary legatee, sought to establish their right to
certain property claimed to have belonged to Mary Jane, and sought to set aside
testimentary dispositions and adjudge the property to the plaintiffs and partition
it among them as heirs. Defendant Cora would share in the relief if obtained.
Held, the prayer to have the will annulled with respect to the residuary clause is
essential to any relief in the suit.
In Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. City of Kalamazoo, 182 Fed. 865 (W. D. Mich.
1910), the mortgagee of all the property of a street railway company sued to en-
join the city from depriving the company of its franchise and to compel the com-
pany to comply with all regulations of the city to preserve the franchise. Held,
the mortgagee's interests, while in some respects the same as those of the company,
were separate and distinct therefrom so that it could protest independently.
10
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property into the hands of the City. Jurisdiction should not be refused just because
the court may think that one cause of action is relatively less important than that
asserted against another defendant.
"One of the tests by which the court may determine whether a defendant
should be aligned with the plaintiff is the prayer for relief." 19 Chase asked that its
lien be construed to cover the entire interest of Indianapolis Gas in the lease which
required payments to stockholders over and above the interest payments for the
bondholders, while Indianapolis Gas was opposed to this. Furthermore, Chase asked
the court to set aside the escrow agreement by which Indianapolis Gas and the
City assumed to exclude Chase from all dominion over the escrow funds. Chase
requested that Indianapolis Gas be denied future control over such funds and that
they be paid directly to itself, while Indianapolis Gas asserted they should be paid
directly to it. Chase requested that its expenses be paid out of the money held in
escrow by the bank. The greater the amount of recovery by Chase the less there will
be for Indianapolis Gas. The trustee also claimed to be entitled to interest at six
per cent after default on coupons which bore a five per cent interest rate. The plain-
tiff also sought to enjoin Indianapolis Gas from interfering with the lease and to
have the lease declared binding on the company as well as the City.
The common attitude on the lease issue by Chase and Indianapolis Gas sprang
from different legal origins. The mortgage was the only possibility that Chase
could rely on to enforce the lease against the City. The rights of Indianapolis
Gas were limited to the lease itself.
The majority of the court said that its basis was "not in legal learning but in
the realities of the record," which meant that it disagreed with the lower court's
view of the facts rather than its view of the law. Review of the facts is not the
conventional function of the Supreme Court After several years of litigation,
jurisdiction should not be overturned on inconsequential grounds or on disagree-
ments with the court below on matters of fact.
Realignment is required when there is no actual controversy between the plain-
tiff and the defendant, or no bona fide prayer of relief against it. From the facts
and pleadings of the Chase case it seems that there was a sufficient collision of
interests between Chase and Indianapolis Gas so that the two should properly be
placed on opposite sides of the litigation.
JOHN C. MILLS, III.
TORTS-HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
Cock-ran v. Thompson.
Action for damages for wrongful death. Plaintiff's husband was struck and
killed by defendant'a train, at a place on the track (located in open country),
19. Mahon v. Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 239 Fed. 266 (C. C. A.
7th, 1917), citing Dawson v. Columbia Ave. Trust Co., see note 3, supra; and Steele
v. Culver, see note 8, supra.
1. 347 Mo. 649, 148 S. W. (2d) 532 (1941).
(Vol. 7
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which was completely fenced and guarded. Occasionally, someone would climb
over or through the fences and guards and use the track for travel parallel to the
direction of the right of way. Deceased had been drinking, and had relaxed on
the track to rest. He was noticed (as an object only) by those in charge of the
engine, in time to have avoided hitting him. But when he was recognized as a
human being, it was too late to avoid the accident Deceased was "hunkered down"
against the west rail with his head lying on the ties or ground; he wore khaki or
light brown clothes, and didn't move when the whistle was sounded. These facts
made him appear to the engineer, fireman, and brakeman, as a roll of brown paper,
until it was too late. The court held that the mere discovery of an object on the
track noti discernible to be a human being does not require employees in charge
to stop or' slacken speed unless circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent;
man to believe that the object was probably a human being; and since there was
no duty of lookout at the spot in question (which the court found after conflicting
evidence as to the quantity of user), there were no such circumstances. Therefore,
there was no negligence.
A number of cases hold that a railroad company will be liable if, after dis-
covering an object on or near the tracks, the trainmen fail to exercise the requisite
degree of care in discovering that it is a human being. But in these cases (other
than those few taking the minority view) Y the circumstances imposed a duty of
lookout,3 such as at crossings,4 or within the limits of a city.5
It has been, said that the duty of lookout is unimportant after the object is
discovered on the track. However, the circumstances from which the duty of look-
out arises play a very important role in determining whether the engineer should
discern the object as a human being. The nature of the locality,6 the probability
that persons may be on the track at the point in question, the exact nature of the
object as it appeared to the trainmen, the reasonableness of their belief that it was
not a human being, and their watchfulness and attention in the interval between
perceiving the object and discovering its true character-all bear on the question,
2. Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1124.
3. Id. at 1121. For cases where the question is left to the jury whether the
railroad had permitted such user by the public as to raise a duty of lookout, see:
Yakubinis v. Missouri, K. & T. R. R., 339 Mo. 1124, 100 S. W. (2d) 461 (1936);
Wise v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 335 Mo. 1168, 76 S. W. (2d) 118 (1934); Savage
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 328 Mo. 44, 40 S. W. (2d) 628 (1931).
4. Womack v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 337 Mo. 1160, 88 S. W. (2d) 368 (1935); -
Matz v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 Mo. 275, 117. S. W. 584 (1909) (no recovery be-
cause, although deceased was discovered, he did not enter the path of the train
until too late to avoid the accident).
5. Werner v. Citizens' Ry., 81 Mo. 368 (1884) (object was on track in heart
of populous city of St Louis).
6. Degonia v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.; 224 Mo. 564, 123 S. W. 807 (1909)(no public user pleaded or proven so no duty of lookout and no recovery); Crossno
v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St Louis, 328 Mo. 826, 41 S. W. (2d) 796 (1931); Car-
penter v. Kurn, 345 Mo. 877, 136 S. W. (2d) 997 (1940) (path across tracks
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and cannot properly be disregarded in determining the liability of the company
in a particular case.7
The mere discovery of an object on the track not discernible to be a human
being does not impose on the employee in charge of the train the duty to stop or
slacken the speed of the train, unless the circumstances are such as would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that the object was probably a human being.8
Hence, in the absence of such circumstances there is no negligence which will render
the railroad company liable.9 Since there were insufficient probabilities of the
presence of people in the instant case to impose the duty of lookout, the same
factors are influential in determining what interpretation the trainmen reasonably
are held to make of the object they did see.
EUGENE M. SACKIN
7. Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1116.
8. Isabel v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 60 Mo. 475 (1875) (defendant railroad
liable for killing of child on the track, where, by the exercise of proper degree of
care, the trainmen, after first observing the object on the track, could have discov-
ered that it was a child in time to stop the train; also, fact that trainmen were
aware that track ran between house where child lived and a well from which family
got water-should increase the trainmen's vigilance); Owen v. Delano, 194 S. W.
756 (Mo. App. 1917) (a question for the jury whether an engineer in the circum-
stances should have discovered that an object seen by him was a human being, be-
fore it was too late to stop the train).
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